This research examines the role of financial policies in Iran using quantitative approaches and investigates the relative importance of financial policies in strengthening economic growth. In this regard, with the help of the Financial Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), this study addresses the issue of which political regime in Iran is placed in the group of "Fiscal dominance" or "monetary dominance" and whether the primary government deficit is adjusted independently of real debts or not. In the next step, the current research investigates to what extent inflation is affected by financial deficits. Such an analysis can be indirect proof of the type of political regime in Iran, as well as an examination of how inflation will react to financial shocks. Financial dominance can have wide dimensions that the policymaker should pay attention to. Based on the results obtained in the econometric model of the research, it can be suggested that the two variables of money volume and budget surplus will have a major contribution to inflation changes. According to the above findings, it can be stated that Iran's economy is placed in the regime group with financial policy dominance because the monetary policymaker considers himself committed to the needs of the financial policymaker. Also, the results of this research show the important role of the budget deficit in determining the exogenousness of money volume in Iran, whose effect will be stable in Iran's economy for the next eight periods.

It is more likely that the monetary policy in Iran is discretionary and not based on a rule or a target. Besides, what is clear is that there have been explicit targets for inflation and economic growth in all five-year development plans (except the fifth plan). However, the question is that do policy makers observe the targets of development plans? Using an adjusted New Keynesian DSGE model for Iran, in this study we investigate the monetary policy under Fiscal dominance and implicit inflation targeting of Iran. The results show that in most plans monetary authorities do not observe the explicit targets of five-year plans. The estimated monetary reaction function is only able to explain the period 2001-2011. The other result is that implementation delays of public projects have considerable effects on output and private consumption.

One of the problems in developing countries is unpleasant nexus between Fiscal and monetary policies. Some of the economists believe that the main reason for inflation in such economies is monetaricizing of Government debt such as bounds. In this article it is tried to estimate the Degree of Fiscal dominance in Iran’s economy using General Equilibrium Dynamic Stochastic Model based on Bayesian approach. Our result reaches to 77 percent for Fiscal dominance which shows a low degree of central bank independence. At the end the usefulness of the obtained results are examined using some indices.

In Iran, due to tax evasion, the government is not able to fully realize its potential tax revenue and usually face budget deficit. On the other hand, the central bank does not have enough independence. In this study, first, the monetary rule was calculated by optimizing the central bank's loss function by considering Fiscal dominance and tax evasion. The derived rule responds to government deb in addition to inflation and GDP. Parameters have been calculated in the framework of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model using Bayesian method based on data 2002-2017. We find that despite the Fiscal dominance and liquidity constraints, tax evasion can act as a buffer layer for economic agents against economic shocks like government expenditure, oil revenue and technology but tax evasion is lead to greater volatility of economic variables. As a result, social welfare is decreased stronger while under Fiscal dominance and absence of tax evasion, optimal monetary rule is impossible.

This paper aims to explain the real-Fiscal linkages by identifying the macroeconomic determinants of government revenue in Iran. To achieve this, the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) method was applied using data from 1972 to 2020. The findings indicate that inflation, centralization, the divergence of public prices from market prices, and the concentration of tax collection on labor income tax all have positive effects on government revenue in Iran. In contrast, economic growth and trade openness have negative effects on government revenue. Overall, these findings support implementing an economic growth strategy that is internally comprehensive within the tax system and externally coherent in terms of the economics of growth, and to which the government has a “tight commitment”. “Internally comprehensive” refers to establishing a mature progressive tax system that includes an inflation-adjusted comprehensive income tax along with automatic complete indexation. When complete and explicit automatic indexation is lacking, Fiscal authorities may still benefit from inflation, which can lead to persistent political incentives for inflation inertia. “Externally coherent” refers to ensuring that aspects such as openness, decentralization of macro-Fiscal decision-making, and the efficient size of government align with the comprehensive tax system to promote economic growth.

In the Iranian economy, a part of the financial needs and liabilities of the government is always financed by the Central Bank. With an increase in the government debts to the Central Bank, monetary policy gets passive and implemented in line with Fiscal policies. Consequently, the functions of the monetary policy are disrupted, and it deviates from its goals. This can have undesirable impacts on the macro-economy. So, this study aims at the macroeconomic effects of the government debts to the Central Bank in Iran during the period of 1973-2017. To this end, a SVAR model is used. The result of the research showed that the government debt to the Central Bank has had no significant effect on the ratio of aggregate demand to aggregate supply, real exchange rate and the relative price of non-tradable goods to tradable goods, but it has significantly increased the prices over a period of three years and decreased the GDP over two years. In the long run, the government debt to the Central Bank has explained 10. 8 percent of variation in the general level of prices and 11. 25 percent of variation in the GDP per person. These results indicate that the Fiscal dominance and the Fiscal Theory of Price Level can account for this situation in the Iranian economy.

CEO-board power relation is a controversial topic in theory and practice. Our research question is, how does the dominance of each party affect the board’ s involvement in the strategy-making process? This study aims to provide a contingency understanding of the subject by using a multi-theoretic approach. In this way, it goes beyond examining the mere structural factors influencing formal power. This study opens the black box of CEO-board interactions from a behavioral standpoint. For a multiple-case-study in six banks, the authors conducted 49 semi-structured interviews. Within and cross-case analyses based on systematic coding led to 15 propositions and conceptual model development. First, researchers observed that at least in the Iranian context, contrary to agency theory, the detrimental effects of board dominance are more significant than the CEO dominance. However, instead of giving linear prescriptions, this study concludes by considering the complex nature of power relations and the necessity of multilevel analysis to understand each power structure’ s preference in different situations. At three levels of analysis, including the group, individual, and organizational levels, concepts such as “ group strategic thinking, ” “ cohesiveness, ” “ sense of belonging, ” “ tendency to political behaviors, ” “ managerial stability, ” “ strategic execution, ” and ultimately “ strategic change” as the desired output of strategic involvement were explored. Authors have explained the relationships between these concepts using multiple theories. Moreover, a more in-depth understanding of power dynamics at the upper echelons is obtained by identifying the moderating roles of “ trust” and “ personality. ”

Fiscal policy is an important macroeconomic policy tool for dampening the amplitude of business cycles in the oil-exporting countries. This importance derives from the fact that these countries have the highest volatility of output in the world and that a majority of countries have exchange rate pegs or manage their exchange rates, thereby limiting the scope of monetary policy. The main objective of this paper is to characterize and explain the determinants of the cyclical behavior of Fiscal policy in Iran during 1979-2011. To this end, we overcome the endogeneity problem using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM). We find that Fiscal policy is strongly pro-cyclical and oil price volatility and quality of institutions have an important role in determining the degree of cyclicality in Fiscal policy. In addition, we focus on the role Played by the Fiscal rule, which appears to be a key determinant of a country’s ability to escape the pro-cyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. However, we find that national Fiscal rules defined in the Third Development Plan as expenditure rule and oil Price-based rule (Foreign Exchange Reserve Account (FRA) Foundation) do not affect the reduction of Fiscal policy pro-cyclicality. Furthermore, we conclude that Iran is unable to run countercyclical Fiscal policies if it has weak institutions quality.

The dominance graph of the binary words, which is denoted by (Γ _n ) ⃗ , is a directed graph whose vertex set is the set of all binary words of length n. Setting B_1 (w)={1≤ i≤ n┤ | w_i=1}, for every vertex 〖 w_1 w_2… w〗 _n, we join two vertices v and w by an arc if B_1 (w) is contained in B_1 (v). In this paper, we study some graphical parameters of this graph. For example, after computing the distance of every two vertices and the eccentricity of any vertex, it is proved that the diameter and the radius of the underlying graph of (Γ _n ) ⃗ equals 3 and 2, respectively. Also, it is proved that this graph has 〖 3〗 ^n-3(2^n-1) edges. Then we prove that both of the clique nmber and the chromatic number of the dominance graph of binary words of length n are n-1. Among other results, it is shown that the edge chromatic number and the maximum degree of vertices are equal to 2^(n-1)-2. Finally, by a combinatorial method, the independence number of this graph is determined, too.